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RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS-ARE HIGHWAY AUTHORiTY OBLI-
GATIONS "DEBTS" OF TH STATE?-In an effort to meet the tremendous
problems of financing the highways of the Commonwealth,1 the 1954
General Assembly of Kentucky enacted legislation which provided for
the establishment of the Kentucky Highway Authority.2 Under the
provisions of this legislation, known as the Kentucky Highway Au-
thority Act, selected state highways were to be transferred to the Ken-
tucky State Highway Authority by the Department of Highways. The
Authority was to issue revenue bonds to secure funds with which to
improve roads and then to lease them back to the Department of High-
ways at a sufficient rental to retire the bonds within forty years. These
lease agreements were to contain pledges, for the full term of the
leases, of the "current resources" of the Department of Highways for
each biennium therein included.3 "Current resources", as defined by
the Act, included substantially all funds bienially accruing to the De-
partment of Highways except certain specified funds which had been
previously ear-marked for other uses.4 The Governor refused to name
the appointive members of the Authority and suit was instituted by
the Commissioner of Highways to compel him to perform this duty
which had been imposed upon him by the Act.5 The Circuit Court
1 Since World War II, vehicle registrations in Kentucky have almost doubled;
construction and highway maintenance costs have risen greatly. These factors,
coupled with the fact that highway construction was virtually halted durinig the
war, have combined to render current revenues insufficient to meet current high-
way maintenance and construction needs, or to provide for needed expansions in
the highway system of the Commonwealth. In 1954, Federal highway matching
funds for use in Kentucky were materially increased, but because the funds can
be used only for new construction and must be matched by state funds, it was
doubtful at the time of the decision noted herein that Kentucky would be able
to take advantage of the entire amount of Federal aid available because of lack
of sufficient funds to devote to new construction. In the Declaration of Legisla-
tive Policy included within the Kentucky Highway Authority Act, it is stated:
"It is the declared policy and purpose of the General Assembly, in enacting this
Chapter, to foster, promote, and expedite the construction, maintenance and im-
provement of a modem and adequate system of roads throughout the Common-
wealth, in the interests of the public safety and general welfare; and, in the
furtherance of such policy and purpose, to authorize the maximum financial com-
mitments permissible under the provisions of the Constitution." Ky. REv. STAT.
175.005 (Supp. 1954).2 Ky. REV. STAT. Chap. 175, 1954 Legislative Supplement to the Kentucky
Revised Statutes.
SCurlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W. 2d 934, 935 (Ky. 1955).
'Ky. REv. STAT. 175.010(7) (Supp. 1954).
'Ky. 1Ev. STAT. 175.030 (1) (Supp. 1954) provides that "Within ninety days
after March 22, 1954, the Governor shall appoint the citizen members of the
Authority..."
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dismissed the plaintiff's petition, holding the Act void in that it violated
the limitations upon the authority of the General Assembly to create
indebtedness imposed by sections 49 and 50 of the Kentucky Con-
stitution.6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding unani-
mously that the provisions of the Act which permitted the Department
of Highways to pledge, for the full term of the leases, its current
resources for each biennium included in the leases, authorized the
creation of an unconstitutional indebtedness of the Commonwealth.
Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W. 2d 934 (Ky. 1955).
It is a basic principle of Kentucky constitutional law that an obliga-
tion which is incurred in one biennium and which is payable in sub-
sequent bienniums is a debt within the meaning of the limitations im-
posed upon indebtedness by the Kentucky Constitution.7 Obviously
the lease agreements contemplated by the Act authorized the Depart-
ment of Highways to contract obligations in one biennium which
were to be payable in subsequent bienniums, and in that sense au-
thorized the creation of a debt. The ultimate question, however, in
the instant case was not whether the Act authorized a debt, but
whether the Act authorized the creation of a debt of the Common-
wealth within the meaning of the constitutional debt limitations. To
sustain their contention that no debt of the state was authorized by
the Act, the appellants advanced two theories: (1) that the Common-
wealth itself would not be bound by the agreements in that the General
Assembly in any future biennium could repudiate the leases by refus-
ing to appropriate funds to the Department of Highways, or, in other
words, the legislature, by failing to appropriate funds defined in the
Act as "current resources" to the Department of Highways, could at
any time effectively escape all liability under the lease agreements;
and (2) that under the "special fund doctrine", obligations payable
solely from funds appropriated to the Department of Highways under
Section 230 of the Kentucky Constitution," as in the instant case, are
8 Sec. 49 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that "The General Assembly
may contract debts to meet casual deficits or failures in the revenue; but such
debts . . . shall not at any time exceed five hundred thousand dollars ... "
See. 50 of that instrument provides that "No Act of the General Assembly shall
authorize any debt to be contracted on behalf of the Commonwealth except for
the purposes mentioned in See. 49, unless provision be made therein to levy and
collect an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest stipulated, and to discharge the
debt within thirty years; nor shall such act take effect until it shall have been
submitted to the people at a general election, and shall have received a majority
of all the votes cast for and against it .. "
State Highway Commission v. King, 259 Ky. 414, 82 S.W. 2d 443 (1935);
Billeter & Wiley v. State Highway Commission, 203 Ky. 15, 261 S.W. 855 (1924);
Crick v. Rash, 190 Ky. 820, 229 S.W. 63 (1921).8 Sec. 230 of the Kentucky Constitution as amended in 1944 provides that
... No money derived from excise or license taxation relating to gasoline and
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not debts of the Commonwealth within the meaning of the Constitu-
tional prohibition against debt.
The court rather summarily disposed of the first contention of ap-
pellants in the following language:
We think that it is an inescapable conclusion that if a state
agency performing a major function of government obligates the funds
to be appropriated to it in future years, a debt of the state is created,
because the state cannot abandon or discontinue the function and
still continue to operate as a government. 9
The court supported this conclusion by pointing out that Section 230
of the Kentucky Constitution restricts to road purposes the expenditure
of all revenues from the gasoline tax and other motor vehicle taxes,
and that any decision by a subsequent legislature to repudiate the
lease agreements by refusing to appropriate these funds for road pur-
poses would necessarily involve an abandonment of these revenue
sources altogether.
The second argument advanced by appellants, based on an applica-
tion of the special fund doctrine, proved considerably more trouble-
some to the court. It is almost universally held that obligations of the
state or an agency thereof which are payable exclusively from a
special fund, and for which the general credit of the state is not
pledged, are not debts of the state within the meaning of state con-
stitutional debt limitations. 10 This unqualified statement of the rule is
of little practical value without further inquiry into the rather difficult
problem of what is necessary to constitute a special fund within the
meaning of the doctrine. Nearly all jurisdictions agree that if an
obligation is payable solely from the revenues realized from the opera-
tion of the particular utility or property acquired with the proceeds
of the obligation, it is payable from a special fund and therefore is not
other motor fuels, and no monies derived from fees, excise or license taxation
relating to registration, operation, or use of vehicles on public highways shall be
expended for other than the cost of administration, statutory refunds and adjust-
ments, payment of highway obligations, costs for construction, reconstruction,
rights of way, maintenance and repair of public highways and bridges, and ex-
pense of enforcing state traffic and motor vehicle laws."
'Supra note 3, at 936-937.
",, California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. 2d 425, 427
(1933); Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, 121 Colo. 521, 218 P. 2d 498,
511-512 (1950); Loomis v. Keehn, 400 Ill. 337, 80 N.E. 2d 368, 371 (1948);
Meagher v. Commonwealth ex rel. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 305
Ky. 289, 203 S.W. 2d 35, 37 (1947); Hughes v. State Board of Health, 260 Ky.
228, 84 S.W. 2d 52 (1935); State ex rel. State Road Commission v. O'Brien, 82
S.E. 2d 903, 905 (W. Va. 1954). See also, 81 C.J.S. 1187-1189, and cases cited
at footnote 9, p. 1187, (1953); Annot., 146 A.L.R. 328 (1943); Annot., 96 A.L.R.
1385 (1934); Annot. 72 A.L.R. 687 (1930); Note, 53 Mich. L.R. 439 (1955).
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a debt within the meaning of constitutional debt prohibitions." The
rationale of this rule, known as the "self-liquidating plan" in Ken-
tucky,12 is that the obligation never becomes a general liability of the
state, or an additional burden on its taxpayers, as the rights of the
creditors are limited to the income produced by the capital assets
purchased with the funds which they have furnished.
Many jurisdictions have extended the special fund doctrine to in-
clude obligations payable solely from a fund created by the imposition
of fees, penalties or excise taxes.' 3 Appellants contended that the
"Good Roads Amendment" to Section 280 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion,14 in setting aside the gasoline taxes and highway license revenues
for road uses exclusively, created such a special fund, and that the
rentals, being payable solely from that fund, were not debts of the
Commonwealth within the meaning of Sections 49 and 50 of the Con-
stitution. Special funds derived from fees and taxes can be created
either by a general statute or by a constitutional provision which ear-
marks certain funds for specified limited uses. Sharp conflict exists on
the issue of whether a fund of this type, created by a mere general
statute, can be a special fund within the meaning of the doctrine.1
'Board of Regents of University of Arizona v. Sullivan, 45 Ariz. 245, 42
P. 2d 619, 625 (1935); California Toll Bridge Authority v. Wentworth, 212 Cal.
298, 298 Pac. 485 (1931); California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, supra note
10; State v. Florida Improvement Commission, 160 Fla. 230, 34 So. 2d 443
(1948); Guthrie v. Curlin, 263 S.W. 2d 240 (Ky. 1953); Preston v. Clements,
313 Ky. 479, 232 S.W. 2d 85 (1950); Meagher v. Commonwealth ex rel. Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission, supra note 10; J. D. Van Hooser & Co. v.
University of Kentucky, 262 Ky. 581, 90 S.W. 2d 1029 (1936); Spence v. Utah
State Agr. College, 225 P. 2d 18 (Utah 1950); Almond v. Gilmer, 188 Va. 822,
51 S.E. 2d 272 (1949).
J. D. Van Hooser & Co. v. University of Kentucky, supra note 11. Under
the Kentucky version of this "self-liquidating plan", the creditors are not strictly
limited to income produced by the capital asset purchased with the proceeds of
the obligation. The Kentucky court has repeatedly held that existing state prop-
erty can be mortgaged and pledged to secure payment of the obligation. This in
effect extends the special fund doctrine to a marked degree, for while the state
cannot be sued by the creditors for a deficiency judgment, they can foreclose on
state property which has been pledged, and to that extent practically can place
a g d ment of the obligation,out of state general funds if necessary. Other cases involving this particular prob-lem include Guthrie v. Curlin, supra note 11; Preston v. Clements, supra note 11;M~eagher v. Commonwealth ex t. Unemployment Compensation Commission,
supra note 10; Hughes v. State Board of Health, supra note 10. For a contrary
decision on this point, see Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N.D. 436, 218 N.W. 
156 (1928).
See .generally, Armot. 100 A.L.R. 900 (1936).
cu Supra note 8.
'Cases which have held a funed created by statute to be within the specialfund doctrine include the following: Willet v. State Board of Examiners, 112 Mont.
317, 115 P. 2d 287, 289 (1941); State ex rel. Capital Addition Bldg. Commission
v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 46 P. 2d 1097, 1101 (1935); State ex t. Coleman v.Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625, 632 (1936); Moses v. Meier, 148 Ore. 185, .35
P. 2d 981 (1934); Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wash. 2d 1, 211 P. 2d 651,
679 (1949). Cases holding contra include People ex te. City of Chicago v. Bar-
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In Crick v. Rash,16 the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a fund
composed of fees and taxes and created by statute is not a special
fund within the meaning of the special fund doctrine as accepted in
this state, saying that:
Under this contention the legislature ... could divide the
public revenue into numerous subdivisions, calling one the "Road
Fund", another the "School Fund", .. .and others almost without
limit. Debts could then be contracted in unlimited amounts and
payable in the far distant future, and still be immune from attack
as violating constitutional provisions limiting indebtedness, provided
each debt was made payable out of some one of the specially desig-
nated funds into which all of the revenue collected by taxation from
the people had been divided. A mere statement of the proposition
carries with it, it seems to us, its own refutation.' 7
Insofar as this extension of the special fund doctrine to include statu-
tory funds composed of fees and taxes is concerned, it would seem
that the position thus taken by the Kentucky court represents the
only view reasonably consistent with the language of the constitutional
debt limitations. A contrary conclusion would strip such provisions
of all effect and meaning.
However, in the instant case the court was not considering a fund
created by mere statute, but was considering the question of whether
a fund derived from fees and taxes, created by constitutional pro-
vision, is a special fund within the meaning of the doctrine as accepted
in Kentucky. The issue had been previously decided in five other
states, the court in each jurisdiction holding that an obligation, pay-
able solely from a constitutionally created fund composed of fees,
penalties, or excise taxes, was payable from a special fund and was
therefore not a debt of the state within the meaning of constitutional
debt limitations.' 8 Despite this persuasive authority the Kentucky
rett, 373 Ill. 393, 26 N.E. 2d 478 (1940); Crick v. Rash, supra note 7; State ex.
tel. Diederichs v. State Highway_ Commission, 89 Mont. 205, 296 P. 1033, 1035
(1931); Boswell v. State, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P. 2d 940, 950 (1937).
Supra note 7.17Id. at 70.
" Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, supra note 10; Johnson v. Mc-
Donald, 97 Colo. 324, 49 P. 2d 1017 (1935); McLucas v. State Bridge Building
Authority 77 S.E. 2d 531 (Ga. 1953); Ziegler v. Witherspoon, 331 Mich. 339, 49
N.W. 2d 318 (1951); Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 327, 190 A. 140 (1937); State
ex tel. State Road Commission v. O'Brien, supra note 10. One state, Colorado,
has expressly distinguished the statutory fund from the constitutional fund, hold-
ing in Re Senate Resolution, 94 Colo. 1, 31 P. 2d 325 (1933), that an obligation
payable from a statutory fund was a debt of the state within the meaning of the
constitutional debt limitation, and then in Johnson v. McDonald, supra, and in
Watrous v. Golden Chamber of Commerce, supra, holding that an obligation pay-
able from a constitutionally established fund was not a debt of the state within
the meaning of the constitutional limitations.
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court refused to extend the special fund doctrine to include such funds,
holding that the doctrine as accepted in this state contemplates only
two types of special funds; those not belonging to the Commonwealth19
and those collected solely "from private persons in the way of com-
pensation for individual benefits received or as fees for the use of the
services of a facility,"20 stating that:
.... the gasoline tax and other motor vehicle taxes, being collected
from the public generally, must be considered to be sources of public
revenue, and as such subject to general constitutional prohibitions
against creating obligations against further revenues. 21
The opinion of the court would seem to further indicate that under
no circumstance will the special fund theory be extended in Kentucky
to include funds derived from taxes.
The decision turns on the fact that the court considered the Act
a deliberate legislative attempt to circumvent the "spirit and purpose"
of the constitutional limitations on indebtedness. The court adopts
the view that the purpose of the constitutional debt limitation is, at
least in part, to prohibit the pledging of future fixed revenues, so that
one legislature cannot paralyze subsequent ones by spending revenues
otherwise available to each. The court concluded that:
... . In the final analysis, the practical result of a state debt is
that future government officials are prevented from expending, for
what they consider the best purposes, the revenues received during
their administration. The fact that the people have expressed through
the Constitution, their desire that certain revenues [gasoline and
auto license taxes] be expended for a specified purpose, does not
mean that the people intended their periodically elected representa-
tives to have any authority other than to expend current revenues for
that purpose.22
Other courts, in construing substantially similar constitutional debt
limitations, have, as we have seen, held that an obligation payable
from a constitutionally created fund composed of fees and taxes is not
a debt of the state within the meaning of such limitations.23 Some
jurisdictions have upheld this extended special fund doctrine solely
upon the ground that the debts referred to in the constitutional limita-
tions are debts which are to be paid from the general property tax,2 4
a ground which would leave the legislature almost without limitation
' For an example of this type of fund, see Tarter v. Skags, 184 Ky. 58, 211
S.W. 203 (1919).1 Supra note 3 at 937. 21Ibid.
2 Id. at 937-938. "Supra note 18.
4State ex rel. Capitol Addition Building Commission v. Connelly, supra note
15, at 1101; Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 301-305, 187 S.E. 153,
157 (1926); Gruen v. State Tax Commission, supra note 15 at 679.
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in view of the diminishing proportional importance of the general
property tax. In refusing to accept the reasoning followed by these
other courts, the Kentucky court has refused to accept a judicial
device, the extended special fund theory, which has enabled these
other courts to lend approval to legislative schemes designed to cir-
cumvent similar constitutional limitations. There can be little doubt
that the court has construed the constitutional debt prohibitions sub-
stantially as the original framers of these provisions in 1849 intended
them to be understood.25 The hardship which this decision works on
the highway program of the Commonwealth is not the result of an
erroneous construction placed upon the Constitution by the Court of
Appeals, but is rather attributable to the lack of foresight exercised
by the framers of our fundamental law.26 The decision properly leaves
to the people of the state the task of revising the Constitution to meet
the needs of the Commonwealth as they themselves feel those needs
exist.
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CoN-rAcrs-BAmin.NT-EFFEcr OF PROvisIONs LnmTING LiABmrr
PRNTED ON PARKING LOT IDENTIFICATION RECEnr-Plaintiff parked his
car overnight in the Parkrite Auto Park in Lexington, Kentucky. He
was handed what was apparently a receipt or identification stub upon
the back of which was the following limitation of the bailee's liability:
See generally REPORT OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION
FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONS~rrUTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY (1949).
See. 49 of the present Constitution was adopted in toto from the Kentucky Con-
stitution of 1849.
"'-Even in 1849 some Kentuckians realized that restrictions such as those
found in Sections 49 and 50 would become obnoxious to the Commonwealth. In
arguing against the adoption of See. 35 of Article Second of the Kentucky Con-
stitution of 1849, which eventually became See. 49 of the present Constitution,
William Preston, Constitutional Convention Delegate from the City of Louisville
said: ". . . There are a hundred reasons why this margin [the $500,000. limit]
should be left with the legislature; and I hope that no personal differences of
opinion, no little spirit of parsimony will prevail on this floor, on such a subject as
this. I hope by our vote on this question we will at least say that the people of
the [C]ommonwealth of Kentucky can afford to repose discretion in their legisla-
ture, to redeem the honor of their state, as its emergencies might require. Impose
this restriction, and you will find that in five or six years an impulse will have
sprung up under the influence of wealth and growing prosperity that will call for
another constitution.
"... A constitution, sir, is a thing that should be made for ages, if made as
it ought to be. It is the embodiment of the great principles lying at the foundation
of society, which should be disturbed as seldom as possible. . . . I merely ask
gentlemen to use some discretion; I ask them not to stigmatize the state by saying
that they have no power in all time to come; I ask them not to deprive the state
of that self-control which belongs to all truly and well organized bodies." REPORT
OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF T=E CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF TE
CONSTITrrTION OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY, 1849 at 782-783.
